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royalty owners one-eighth of the actual "proceeds" from the sale of the
gas, the term "amount realized from such sale" should be incorporated
into the lease."°
Arthur W. Zeitler
Federal Income Tax - Kimbell-Diamond, Section 334(b)(2)
and the "Indirect Purchaser"
Over a period of about fourteen months, and through two separate
tender offers, American Potash and Chemical Corporation (Potash) ac-
quired all of the outstanding stock of Western Electrochemical Corpora-
tion (Wecco). Thereafter, for a period of about seven months, Potash op-
erated Wecco as a wholly owned subsidiary, advancing operating capital,
and assuming all of Wecco's liabilities.' Finally, Wecco was liquidated
completely, and Potash assumed direct ownership of the Wecco assets. For
the four following taxable years, Potash depreciated the Wecco assets on
the basis of the cost to Potash of the assets. The Commissioner, believing
that the proper basis from which to compute the depreciation was the
basis of the assets in the hands of Wecco prior to liquidation (i.e., a carry-
over basis), determined a deficiency in Potash's tax returns for those
years.! After payment of the deficiency and denial of its claim for refund,
Potash instituted suit, contending that a cost basis was proper for the as-
sets received. Potash claimed first that no reorganization had occurred. This
would make inapplicable section 362 (b),' which requires assets received in
a reorganization to be taken with a carry-over basis. Secondly, Potash
maintained that although section 334(b) () requires assets received in
30 For an example of a royalty clause which will cover most situations, see 6 V. FLITTIE,
SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 1131, at 19 (1967).
' Potash advanced $646,293 to Wecco and assumed $4,934,448 in liabilities. Because under
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B), (C), the consideration must be "solely voting
stock," Potash attempted to prove that such items as the cash payment for fractional shares, the
advanced operating capital and the assumed liabilities should be included in the total consideration
for the purpose of disqualifying the transaction as a reorganization. However, the court did not
reach this question.
Potash's "cost" basis in the Wecco assets was $7,085,551. The basis which these assets had in
the hands of Wecco prior to liquidation was $3,788,779. Use of a cost basis gave Potash an annual
increase in its depreciation deductions of $100,843. It was this sum which the Commissioner de-
termined to have been a deficiency in Potash's returns for each of the four preceding years.
3INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 362(b) provides:
If property was acquired by a corporation in connection with a reorganization to
which this part applies, then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands
of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recognized to the transferor on
such transfer. This subsection shall not apply if the property acquired consists of
stock or securities in a corporation a party to the reorganization, unless acquired
by the issuance of stock or securities of the transferee . . . as the consideration in
whole or in part for the transfer.
4INT. REV. CooE of 1954, § 334(b) provides:
(1) In general.-If property is received by a corporation in a distributiou in
complete liquidation of another corporation (within the meaning of section 332 (b)),
then, except as provided in paragraph (2), the basis of the property in the hands
of the distributee shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor.
If property is received by a corporation in a transfer to which section 332(c)
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liquidation of a subsidiary to be taken with a carry-over basis, the rule of
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner' allows the transaction to
be treated as one purchase of assets rather than as several steps culminating
in liquidation. Held: Where no reorganization has occurred, assets re-
ceived through a stock acquisition and subsequent liquidation may be
depreciated on a cost basis under the Kimbell-Diamond rule, despite failure
of the transaction to qualify for the cost basis exception of section
334(b) (2). American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 399
F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
I. "'INDIRECT PURCHASE" PRIOR TO 1954
The acquisition by one corporation of the assets of another corporation
may be effected either directly or indirectly. Typical of a direct acquisi-
tion is the simple purchase' of all or a part of the transferor's assets. Typ-
ical of the indirect acquisition is the purchase or exchange of property
for the transferor's stock, followed by liquidation of the acquired cor-
poration.' Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 the form of the
acquisition greatly affected the tax treatment of the assets acquired. For
example, in a direct acquisition, the transferee generally took the acquired
assets with a cost basis under section 113(a),' which provided that the
basis of property should be its cost except as provided otherwise in the
Code. However, strict application of the Code prevented the "indirect pur-
chaser" from receiving identical treatment' because section 113 (a) (15)'
applies, and if paragraph (2) of this subsection does not apply, then the basis
of the property in the hands of the transferee shall be the same as it would be
in the hands of the transferor.
(2) Exception.-If property is received by a corporation in complete liquidation
of another corporation (within the meaning of section 332(b)), and if-
(A) the distribution is pursuant to a plan of liquidation adopted-
(i) on or after June 22, 1954, and
(ii) not more than two years after the date of the transaction described
in subparagraph (B) (or, in the case of a series of transactions, the
date of the last such transaction); and
(B) stock of the distributing corporation possessing at least 80 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and
at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock (except non-voting stock which is limited and preferred as to divi-
dends), was acquired by the distributee by purchase (as defined in paragraph
(3)) during a 12-month period beginning with the earlier of-
(i) the date of the first acquisition by purchase of such stock, or
(ii) if any of such stock was acquired in an acquisition which is a purchase
within the meaning of . . . paragraph (3), the date on which the dis-
tributee is first considered under section 318(a) as owning stock owned
by the corporation from which such acquisition was made,
then the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the
adjusted basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution was made.
O 14 T.C. 74, aff'd, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
6 Here, "purchase" refers merely to an acquisition of the transferor corporation's assets without
resort to a purchase or acquisition of stock followed by liquidation. However, it is important to
realize that "purchase" has a specific meaning in § 334(b) (3).
'See cases cited at note 51 infra.
8Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113(a), 53 Stat. 43 (now TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
1012).
I B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLD-
ERS § 9.44 (2d ed. 1966).
°Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, S 113(a) (15), 53 Stat. 43 (now TNT. REV. CODE of 1954.
5 334(b) (1)).
required all property received by a corporation upon a distribution in
liquidation of another to be taken with a carry-over basis.1 The inequi-
table consequences of this discrimination caused the courts to look to the
substance of such transactions, rather than to the form. 2
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner"s is often cited for the
proposition that the individual steps of a transaction may be considered to-
gether in attaching tax consequences.'" In that case corporation K at-
tempted to acquire replacement assets for business facilities destroyed by
fire. Not being able to purchase such assets directly it acquired for cash
the stock of corporation W, an owner of such assets. Pursuant to a resolu-
tion of K's directors, W was liquidated approximately one week after the
acquisition of stock. The most important issue was whether the stock pur-
chase and subsequent liquidation could be treated as one purchase of as-
sets, or whether each transaction had to be considered separately. If the
former represented the proper treatment, a cost basis would obtain un-
der section 113 (a)." If the latter was correct, the assets would be treated
as though received in liquidation of a subsidiary, and would be taken with
a carry-over basis under the applicable provision of the 1939 Code.6 Be-
cause the purchaser's sole intention was to acquire assets rather than
stock, the court held that the two transactions should be treated as one
purchase of assets." Accordingly, a cost basis was required. The "Kimbell-
Diamond rule" served as the "indirect purchaser's" only route to a cost
basis until 1954."
II. "INDIRECT PURCHASE" AFTER 1954
The 1954 Code carried forward to section 334(b) (1)" the general
rule" requiring a carry-over basis for assets received in liquidation of a
subsidiary. However, with the new Code came enactment of section
334(b) (2) ,2 a statutory exception to the general rule. This section em-
bodies a principle underlying the Kimbell-Diamond rule, viz., that a
stock purchase and subsequent liquidation which are actually part of a
plan to obtain assets should be treated like a direct purchase of assets.
" Liquidation being the common denominator of all indirect acquisitions, this provision pre-
vented any assets acquired indirectly from being taken with a cost basis.
"Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74, aff'd, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951), citing Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588
(6th Cir. 1938); see 2-J. RABRIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, AND ESTATE TAXA-
TION § 23.11(4) (1967) and cases cited therein.
13 14 T.C. 74, aff'd, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
14 See Kanawha Gas & Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954); Ashland
Oil & Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938). See also B. BITTKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 9, S 1.05.
"' The government contended that corporation K should hold the assets with a cost basis.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, S 113 (a) (15), 53 Stat. 43. See note 10 supra, and accom-
panying text.
"114 T.C. 74, 80 (1950).
" It is interesting to note that in the case of Kimbell-Diamond, the cost basis which the tax-
payer was forced by the decision to use was lower than the basis which the assets had in the hands
of transferor.
"' INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, S 334(b) (1); see note 4 supra.
"This was the rule of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113 (a) (15), 53 Stat. 43 (now INT.
REXv. CODE of 1954, § 334(b)(1)).
" INT. REv. COnE of 1954, § 3 34(b) (2); see note 4 supra.
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However, unlike the Kimbell-Diamond rule, section 334 (b) (2) looks sole-
ly to the form of the transaction. The statute requires that five basic con-
ditions be met: (1) that eighty per cent control be obtained within a
period of twelve months; (2) that a plan of liquidation be adopted with-
in twenty-four months following the qualifying purchase; (3) that the
liquidation be completed within three years following the close of the year
in which the first distribution is made; (4) that eighty per cent of the
voting stock and eighty per cent of all other stock (except non-voting
preferred) be purchased; and (5) that the stock be "purchased" (thus
eliminating the use of this technique when stock is obtained in a tax-free
transaction such as a reorganization)."'
The inflexible requirements of section 334 (b) (2) present two principal
problems. First, no intent to "purchase" or "acquire" assets is required
under the statute. It is only necessary that the transferee have adopted a
plan of liquidation within two years after the acquisition of the trans-
feror's stock. Although the statute presumably was enacted to equalize
the tax position of "indirect purchasers" with that of "direct purchasers,"
it can apply equally well to taxpayers which have not intended to be
purchasers at all."' Thus many "indirect purchase" transactions may be
manipulated to meet, or fall short of, the statutory requirements. Accord-
ingly, a corporate taxpayer is afforded some choice in the tax treatment
of its transaction if section 334(b) (2) is the only way to obtain a cost
basis'
The second problem created by section 334 (b) (2) is that many indirect
acquisitions may be excluded from its ambit, notwithstanding the fact
that they are undertaken for the sole purpose of obtaining assets." Thus, a
taxpayer may desire a cost basis but be unable to get it under the statute
because of failure to meet the mechanical statutory requirements." This
problem would be remedied if the Kimbell-Diamond rule remains opera-
tive despite the enactment of section 334(b) (2). However, authorities
are divided on this point.' If, as some writers have suggested, the statute
is the only route to a cost basis from a stock acquisition and subsequent
"A. CHOKA, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 125 (1965).
2Rev. Rul. 60-262, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 114; 3A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 21.167, at 476 (1968); 2 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME,
GIFT, AND ESTATE TAXATION § 23.11 (5) (1967).
" That Congress was aware of this possibility can scarcely be doubted, for whenever the Code
provides a time limit or mechanical procedure, the taxpayer is afforded some measure of choice.
2See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff (Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment) at
19, American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968). See also
note 28 infra.
" This was the situation in American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
"J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, AND ESTATE TAXATION 5 23.11(4)
(1967); Brookes, Corporate Liquidations, 1960 So. CAL. TAX INST. 233; Cohen, Gelberg, Surrey,
Tarleau & Warren, Corporate Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 55 COLUM.
L. REV. 37 (1955); Freling, What is New in Subchapter C: The Service's Current Ruling Policy,
23 N.Y.U. INST. ON FEDERAL TAXATION 421 (1965); Goldman, The C Reorganization, 19 TAX
L. REV. 31 (1963); Mansfield, The Kimbell-Diarnond Situation: Basis to the Purchaser in Connec-
tion with Liquidation, 13 N.Y.U. INST. ON FEDERAL TAXATION 623 (1955); Schwartz, Acquisi-




liquidation, many taxpayers" are in no better position than they would
have been under the 1939 Code.
III. AMERICAN POTASH & CHEMICAL CORP. V. UNITED STATES
A conclusion that Potash could be entitled to a cost basis in assets re-
ceived from the Wecco liquidation required two findings. 9 First, because
section 362"° requires a carry-over basis for assets received in a section 368"'
reorganization, the court had to determine that neither a type B3" nor a
type C3 reorganization had occurred. Second, the transaction had to be
considered a single purchase of assets under the Kimbell-Diamond rule.
This required a finding that the Kimbell-Diaimond rule was not rendered
obsolete by enactment of section 334(b) (2) .4
The most curious aspect of the court's opinion is its initial dismissal of
the possibility that a "B" reorganization occurred.35 It took this position
on the ground that "control of Wecco was not obtained . . . within a 12
month period . . . as is required by the applicable regulations."3 Only on
rehearing"7 did the court seem to admit that the regulation in question
28 For example, if business necessitates the postponement of a liquidation past the two-year
statutory limit, the transaction will not qualify under § 334(b) (2) even though it may meet
all other requirements. Likewise, if corporation X has owned 30 per cent of the stock of corpora-
tion Y for more than one year, and liquidates Y immediately after purchasing the remaining 70
per cent, the transaction will fail to qualify under the statute. The acquiring corporation has not
in the latter case, acquired 80 per cent of the transferor's stock within 12 months.
" It was conceded that Potash could not obtain a cost basis under § 334(b) (2), because con-
trol of Wecco assets was not obtained within 12 months as required by the statute. See 399 F.2d
194, 207 (Ct. Cl. 1968). The "12-month issue" involved at this point is to be distinguished from
the "12-month issue" involved in determining whether a "B" reorganization occurred. See note 38
infra, and accompanying text.
'3INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 362(b); see note 3 supra.
" INT. REV-. CODE Of 1954, § 368 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Reorganization
(1) In general.-For purposes of parts I and II and this part, the term "reor-
ganization" means- . . . (B) the acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely
for all or a part of its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the
voting stock of a corporation which is in control of the acquiring corporation)
of stock of another corporation if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring
corporation has control of such other corporation (whether or not such acquiring
corporation had control immediately before the acquisition) ; (C) the acquisition
by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock (or in
exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corporation which is in
control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all of the properties of an-
other corporation, but in determining whether the exchange is solely for stock the
assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or the fact that
property acquired is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded [except as provided
in section 368(a) (2) (B)] ..
3INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B); see note 31 supra. If a "B" reorganization oc-
curred, the assets received would be taken with a carry-over basis under S 362 or § 334(b) (1).
The applicable section would be determined by whether the liquidation is given independent tax
significance or not-an approach reminiscent of Kimbell-Diamond. See American Potash & Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 200 (Ct. Cl. 1968). See also B. BITTKeR & J. EUSTICE,
supra note 9, § 12.13(6).
"I NT. REV. ConE of 1954, 5 368(a)(1)(C); see note 31 supra. This section involves a
stock for asset exchange, and accordingly the assets received are taken with a § 362 carry-over
basis.
" This was true because even if the transaction was not a reorganization, a carry-over basis
could be imposed under § 334(b)(1) if Kimbell-Diamond was found unavailable. (The parties
agreed that the transaction failed to qualify for cost basis treatment under § 334(b)(2)).
35399 F.2d 194, 200 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
38 Id.
.7 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1968) [rehearing].
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should not be given the weight of statutory authority. The regulation ac-
tually provides that a series of transactions can constitute a "B" reorgani-
zation if such transactions take place "over a relatively short period of
time such as 12 months. '' s The case was returned to the trial commis-
sioner for further inquiry on the matter, with the observation that a
series of transactions taking place over a period in excess of twelve months
might be found to be a "B" reorganization if the several transactions
were part of a continuing offer to purchase."9
Also interesting was the government's insistence that the Potash trans-
action could qualify as a "C" reorganization, a stock for asset exchange.
The government had to rely upon the Kiinbell-Diamond rule and Potash's
admitted intent to acquire the Wecco assets in order to show that an ex-
change of stock for assets had occurred. It was this same basic argument
upon which Potash later relied to avoid becoming subject to the carry-
over basis provision of section 334 (b) (1). The court rejected the govern-
ment's contention, observing that intent to acquire assets does not consti-
tute proof that a reorganization has occurred.' The court noted that a
seriatim or "creeping" acquisition is not permissible under section 368-
(a) (1) (C). 41
Kimbell-Diamond and Section 334(b) (2). Potash contended that section
334(b) (2) is not the only way to obtain a cost basis where assets have
been received in liquidation of a subsidiary. Its position was that the Kim-
bell-Diamond rule remains available for the purpose of finding a purchase
of assets in substance where in form there has been a receipt of assets in
liquidation. The government's response was not inconsistent with its for-
mer position. Without attacking the general validity of the step transac-
tion doctrine,4' it argued that section 334(b) (2) is the only way to ob-
tain a cost basis for assets received in liquidation of a subsidiary. The gov-
ernment insisted that because Potash had failed to qualify for a cost basis
under section 334(b) (2) (both parties agreed that Potash failed to ob-
tain the requisite eighty per cent control within twelve months) the
Wecco assets were held with a carry-over basis under section 334(b) (1).
The court agreed with Potash, holding that the well known judicial
rule had not been rendered obsolete by enactment of section 334(b) (2).
Recognizing that Congress intended to provide an "objective route for ob-
" Treas. Reg, § 1.368-2(c) (1960).
'9402 F.2d 1000, 1001 (Ct. Cl. 1968) [rehearing].
40399 F.2d 194, 201 (Ct. CI. 1968).
41 Id. at 202.
42 The step transaction doctrine is a broad rule which finds application in many areas of tax
law. In a technical sense, the Kimbell-Diamond rule is merely one application of it. To be pre-
cisely accurate, it is the step transaction doctrine which permits the steps of an "integrated"
transaction to be considered together in attaching tax consequences. The Kimbell-Diamond rule
merely allows this to be done (under the facts of that case) in an "indirect purchase" situation.
Accordingly, the government could admit the existence of the step transaction doctrine and still
argue with consistency that the Kimbell-Diamond rule is no longer viable. It is only because
Kimbell-Diamond is often cited as authority for the step transaction doctrine that there appears
to be inconsistency in the government's position.
a' 399 F.2d at 207.
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taining a cost basis,"" the court nevertheless held that resort to proof of
subjective intent to acquire assets was not obviated by enactment of the
statute. The principle of section 3 34 (b) (2), said the court, is merely one
application of the broader doctrine of Kim bell-Diamond.' The court also
observed that by abandoning all resort to proof of subjective intent, a
taxpayer would be allowed to choose the tax treatment most beneficial to
it. The court believed that such an elective situation was not contemplated
by Congress." Finally, the court observed that section 334(b) (2) applies
only to corporate taxpayers, and that Congress would not have intended
to differentiate between individuals and corporations by leaving the
Kimbell-Diamond rule available to the former while denying it to the
latter." The case was returned to the trial commissioner to determine the
applicability of the Kimbell-Diamond rule to the facts of Potash."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether the court should have reached the issue of Kimbell-Diamond
and section 334(b) (2) is arguable, but its conclusions in that part of
the opinion are highly significant. The argument advanced by Potash and
adopted by the court is subtle and not to be confused with qualification
for cost basis treatment under section 334(b) (2). Section 334(b) (2) is
concerned exclusively with the liquidation of a subsidiary corporation.
Under section 334(b) (2) it is possible to acknowledge that a parent-
subsidiary relationship existed at the time of liquidation and still obtain a
cost basis in assets received. Although the statute may have been designed
to effectuate certain principles of the Kimbell-Diamond rule, it in no way
requires that the attributes of a typical parent-subsidiary relationship be
absent. The argument under the Kimbell-Diamond rule, on the other
hand, requires proof of an object to obtain assets rather than a subsidiary.
Under the Kimbell-Diamond rule it must be argued that section 334 is
inapplicable, because for tax purposes there has been no subsidiary, and no
liquidation.' Thus, while section 334(b) (2) provides an exception to the
general rule that assets received in liquidation of a subsidiary are taken
with a cost basis, Kimbell-Diamond provides an alternate route.
Because neither a cost basis nor a carry-over basis is consistently desir-
able, the court's decision in American Potash is neither a victory for tax-
payers nor for the government. Whether actually desirous of a cost basis
or not, the taxpayer who qualifies under section 334(b) (2) is assured of
441d. at 207, 208.4 Id. at 208. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1954).
4' 399 F.2d at 208.
4 Id. However, an opposite conclusion could be reached from a reading of the legislative
history of § 334(b) (2). Because the House Report on the proposed statute would have had §
334(b) (2) apply to both corporations and individuals, and the Senate Report modified the House
proposal so as to make the statute applicable to corporate taxpayers alone, it could be concluded
that Congress did intend to differentiate between individual and corporate taxpayers. See American
Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 208, 209 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
41id. at 209.
41 Brief for Plaintiff (Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment) at 15, Ameri-




cost basis treatment. However, for the taxpayer who seeks a carry-over
basis, there is no safety in purposely failing to qualify for section 334-
(b) (2) if the Kimbell-Diamond rule remains viable. The court may still
find intent to obtain assets and impose a cost basis.
For the taxpayer such as Potash, seeking a cost basis but failing to quali-
fy for section 334 (b) (2), problems of proof remain. A liberal interpreta-
tion of the objective standards of the statute will not suffice to determine
what transactions should qualify under the Kimbell-Diamond rule. Be-
cause the latter rule is principled on intent to obtain assets, time limits and
specific procedures are significant only in relation to the business back-
ground of each case. Nevertheless, several characteristics of a true "indirect
purchase" may be stated on the basis of prior decisions and analogy to a di-
rect purchase situation. Primarily, evidence should exist that the acquisition
of stock by the taxpayer corporation was for the ultimate purpose of ac-
quiring assets. Although section 334 (b) (2) encompasses transactions where
the plan to liquidate was formulated after the acquisition of the stock, it
seems reasonable that under Kiinbell-Diamond a "purchase of assets"
should be found only where stock is acquired with a prior purpose of ob-
taining assets by liquidation. Evidene of such a purpose might be found
in the minutes or resolutions of the transferee corporation."0 It can also be
persuasive that the transferee has engaged in prior, unsuccessful attempts
to purchase such assets directly, 1 that the assets were ultimately integrated
into the transferee's business, 2 and that the transferor's business activities
were discontinued."
Also, if liquidation is alleged to be but one step in the acquisition of
assets and therefore is to be ignored for tax purposes, it should be effected
as soon as practicable after acquisition of the transferor's stock. Under
the Kimbell-Diamond rule, the taxpayer can scarcely stress the transitory
nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship if the subsidiary is operated
for an unnecessarily extended period of time. Although liquidation of the
subsidiary in Kimbell-Diamond was effected within one week after pur-
chase of the subsidiary's stock, Potash operated Wecco for seven months.
No precise time limit has been suggested by the courts,5 but it seems nec-
essary that a cost basis proponent show the existence of business justifica-
tion for any significant delay in effecting liquidation.
S. David Blinn
"0Such evidence in the corporate records was abundant in Kionbell-Diamond. See also Trianon
Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 156 (1958).
S" Long Island Water Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 377, 389 (1961) [dictum); George
Haiss Mfg. Co., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 57,241 (1957); Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Com-
missioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1951).
"North Am. Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 677, 691 (1960); Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1951).
"aTrianon Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 156 (1958); Simmons Co. v. Commissioner,
25 T.C. 635 (1955).
"4Although under 5 334(b)(2), liquidation only need be within two years after control of
the transferor is acquired, the courts, while not uniform, are more restrictive in applying Kimbell-
Diamond. A six-month delay has qualified under Kimbell-Diamond. Kanawha Gas & Util. Co. v.
Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954); Snively v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 850 (1953).
A one-year delay qualified as an acquisition of assets under Kimbell-Diamond in Commissioner
v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938), but failed to do so in Trianon Hotel
Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 156 (1953).
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